TELEVISION: PEER-TO-PEER’S NEXT
CHALLENGER
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ABSTRACT
The entertainment industry has obsessed over the threat of
peer-to-peer file sharing since the introduction of Napster in 1999.
The sharing of television content may present a compelling case for
fair use under the long-standing “Betamax” decision. Some argue
that television sharing is fundamentally different than the
distribution of music or movies since television is often distributed
for free over public airwaves. However, a determination of fair use
is unlikely because of the fundamental differences between
recording a program and downloading it, recent regulation to
suppress unauthorized content distribution and shifts in the
television market brought on by new technology.

INTRODUCTION
Although much of the controversy surrounding peer-to-peer trading
of entertainment files has centered on the music and movie industries, the
television industry faces an increasing threat and may be forced to
reevaluate its long-standing, advertising-based business model. For
example, the introduction of Personal Video Recorders (“PVRs”) and PCbased TV tuners, which allow subscribers to record and digitally store hours
of television programming,2 has loosened the television industry’s control
over when and how content is consumed. Indeed, the steady rise in the
unauthorized trading of copyrighted content via the Internet3 may soon
¶1
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force the television industry to consider lawsuits against networks and
individual users alike.4
¶2
In general, today’s PVRs do not allow users to transfer copyprotected content to removable digital media (such as recordable DVDs), 5
thus reducing the likelihood of widespread unauthorized distribution.6
However, by using either a PC with a built-in TV tuner or a TV “capture
card,” which can be purchased for only $50, file traders can currently easily
record television content, transfer it to digital files and distribute this
content via the Internet using available peer-to-peer networks.7 Although
Microsoft is taking steps to limit TV recording capability within its
operating system,8 major computer hardware manufacturers have also
entered the television recording business. In January 2005, Hewlett Packard
introduced the “HP Media Hub,” a home media console with robust
recording and storage capabilities.9 As a result of the increased ease with
which consumers can record and digitally store content, over 20,000
television files were available on the Internet as of May 2004, according to
BayTSP.10 By January 2005, episodes of The Simpsons alone were being
traded via peer-to-peer networks at the rate of almost one million files per
week.11

4

Michael Snider, Hot Television, MACLEANS, Nov. 29, 2004 at
http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/technology/article.jsp?content=20041129_93
836_93836 (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
5
TiVo announced a new service, TiVoToGo, in January 2005 that allows users
to transfer programs to personal computers in password-encrypted form, as well
as plans to eventually allow transfer to DVD recorders. However, this program
would specifically block copy-protected content from transfer, thus protecting
against the use of TiVo to create and distribute unauthorized content. Jonathan
Skillings, TiVo Goes Mobile With New Free Service, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 3,
2005 at http://news.com.com/2102-1041_3-5510240.html?tag=st.util.print (last
visited Jan. 10, 2005).
6
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., EFF OVERVIEW OF BROADCAST PROTECTION
DISCUSSION GROUP, at
http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/HDTV/?f=20020117_eff_bpdg_overview.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
7
Graham, supra note 3.
8
Microsoft announced plans in January 2005 to incorporate advanced copyprotection in its operating system in order to prevent unauthorized TV recording
and distribution. John Borland, Microsoft, Macrovision align on copy
protection, CNET NEWS.COM, January 31, 2005 at
http://news.com.com/Microsoft%2C+Macrovision+align+on+copy+protection/2
100-1030_3-5557984.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
9
HP to Offer TV Media Hub, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at C5.
10
Graham, supra note 3.
11
Manly & Markoff, supra note 3.

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 7

In response to the threat of unauthorized television distribution, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently endorsed Digital
Broadcast Content Protection, known as “Broadcast Flag,” which
specifically requires the manufacturers of hardware that receive digital
television signals to detect and prevent the distribution of copy-protected
content.12 Broadcast Flag was designed to prevent the distribution of
recorded television shows via unauthorized distribution channels, such as
peer-to-peer networks.13 Despite these protections, it is unlikely that
television trading will be completely eradicated because, due to the viral
nature of online digital file sharing, the creation of only one unauthorized,
unencrypted copy facilitates distribution to thousands of users.14 Therefore,
the threat of unauthorized trading of television content via the Internet is
likely to persist regardless of future encryption and protection policy.
¶3

¶4
However, the trading of television content, much of which is
distributed free-of-charge over public airwaves by the major broadcast
networks, may present a much stronger argument for “fair use” than those
posed for music or movies.15 In 1984’s landmark case of Sony Corporation
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (familiarly known as the
“Betamax” case), the United States Supreme Court declined to find
numerous Video Cassette Recorder (“VCR”) manufacturers responsible for
facilitating alleged copyright infringement against television copyright
holders.16 The decision carved out a fair use exemption for the consumers’
right to record television programs for viewing at a later time, a practice
known as “time-shifting.”17 Betamax also established that manufacturers
would not be liable for the distribution of products that facilitate copyright
infringement if that challenged functionality was also “capable of
substantial noninfringing uses.”18
¶5
All U.S. television consumers have access to freely distributed
broadcast network content via the airwaves. In addition, 67% of U.S.
households subscribe to some form of cable television service.19 Based on
12

FCC, DIGITAL BROADCAST CONTENT PROTECTION, FCC 03-273, I,4 (2003).
Id.
14
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Copy
Protection, Dec. 6, 2002, available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/drm/broadcastflagcomments.html (last visited Jan.
10, 2005).
15
Originally developed through judicial precedent and later codified by
Congress in 1976, the “fair use” doctrine provides immunity from infringement
liability for certain uses of copyright protected works. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
16
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 441.
19
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. MEDIA MGMT CTR, Cable Size, Mar. 16, 2004 (citing
Nelsen Media Research), at
13
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the wide reach of cable programming, it is highly likely that many
television file traders are fully subscribed and authorized to view cable or
broadcast content upon its original transmission. An argument can be made
that acquiring a televised program via an online file-sharing network after
its initial airdate is the latest evolution of consumer time-shifting. In fact,
many current television traders believe their conduct to be completely
ethical20 and legal.21 According to this argument, rather than viewing the
program during its original broadcast, the consumer has merely chosen to
shift the viewing of the program to a more convenient time by acquiring
that file from a fellow television subscriber on a peer-to-peer network.
The distinction between personally recording a program and
acquiring that program from another subscriber may weigh against fair use
and is discussed below. However, it is conceivable that the distribution of
television shows via peer-to-peer networks could qualify as fair use under
Betamax,22 although several key distinctions and developments since 1984
suggest that such protection is unlikely.
¶6

¶7
At the same time, some television content distributors seeking
audiences beyond their current broadcast timeslot or cable subscriber base
may choose to authorize and even promote the distribution of their
programming through the cheap and efficient channel of peer-to-peer filetrading networks. Therefore, even if downloading television programs is not
protected as fair use, authorized file-trading has the potential to become a
commercially viable option for some content owners.
¶8
This iBrief examines the unauthorized file-sharing of television
content as a potential fair use, focusing specifically on the first and fourth
factors of the fair use analysis and recent shifts in legislative policy with
respect to copyright protection of digital entertainment. Television filesharing demonstrates some potential for fair use protection because (1)
downloading shows to watch them at a more convenient time is arguably
noncommercial; (2) a substantial segment of downloaders had access to the
programs during their original broadcast; and (3) like the VCR, the impact

http://www.mediainfocenter.org/television/cable/size.asp (last visited Jan. 10,
2005).
20
NBC executive Brandon Burgess summed up the current sentiment of filesharers who feel “a sense of entitlement that once [television] hits the airwaves
it’s free.” Manly & Markoff, supra note 3.
21
Duke University student Elliot Wolf suggested that he may challenge an
MPAA warning for illegally trading television files on the grounds that his
actions were not prohibited under current law. Kelly Rohrs, Student Challenges
MPAA warning, DUKE CHRON., Nov. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.chronicle.duke.edu/vnews/display.v/ART/2004/11/30/41ac6a2fd7d0
4?in_archive=1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
22
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
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of unauthorized downloading on television revenues may prove to be
minimal. However, this practice is unlikely to be protected as fair use
because (1) the distinction between recording in the home and downloading
via an anonymous network weighs against the activity being considered
noncommercial use; (2) new distribution options offered at a premium fee,
such as “video-on-demand” (VOD) and DVD compilations, can be avoided
through file-sharing at a cost to the copyright holder; (3) the enhanced easeof-use of digital technology may result in a more substantial and detrimental
affect on advertising revenue; and (4) significant legislation designed to
prevent unauthorized distribution of digital entertainment evidences a shift
in policy weighing against fair use. Although many copyright holders may
stand to gain financially by authorizing some forms sharing, this practice is
unlikely to be protected as an exception to copyright infringement liability.

I. THE EVOLUTION OF TV FILE SHARING
A. The rise of file-sharing
Since the introduction of the player piano in the early 20th century,
the entertainment industry has struggled to suppress technological
innovations that threaten to drastically alter existing revenue models.23
However, the onset of compression technologies and file-sharing networks
in the late 1990s allowed widespread, unauthorized distribution of digital
entertainment files via the Internet and has presented, arguably, the most
concrete threat to existing business models for the entertainment industry to
date.24

¶9

¶10
The threat of file-sharing most immediately affected the music
industry, which filed highly-publicized copyright infringement lawsuits
against file-sharing networks, such as Napster,25 and, beginning in 2003,
against individual file-sharers.26 Furthermore, representatives of the movie
industry joined record companies in the “Grokster” action, which accused
peer-to-peer networks of copyright infringement for facilitating illicit
unauthorized distribution of protected content.27 Most recently, the movie

23

JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 47 (2000).
WILLIAM FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE
OF ENTERTAINMENT, 15-16 (Stanford University Press 2004).
25
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1157
(9th Cir. 2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001).
26
Katie Dean, RIAA Legal Landslide Begins, WIRED.COM, Sept. 8, 2003, at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,60345,00.html (last visited Jan.
10, 2005).
27
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 380 F.3d at 1154.
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industry challenged the unauthorized trading of motion pictures by bringing
suits against individual file-traders in November 2004.28

B. Television’s advertising-based revenue model
¶11
Unlike the movie and music industries, which generate substantial
revenues by selling content directly to consumers on an a la carte basis (i.e.,
sale of a ticket to one movie, sale of one CD, etc.), television has
historically exploited its copyrights by using an advertising-based model.29
Presently, television programming is distributed free of charge (for
broadcast) or within a monthly subscription package (for cable or satellite).
Under this model, “film and television producers get paid by advertisers that
sponsor the broadcasts” rather than by consumers.30 The district court
articulated this still-dominant model in Betamax,31 explaining that:

[A]dvertisers typically pay the broadcasters a fee for each
transmission of an advertisement based on an estimate of the
expected number and characteristics of the viewers who will watch
the program. While, as members of the general public, the viewers
indirectly pay for the privilege of viewing copyrighted material
through increased prices for the goods and services of the
advertisers, they are not involved in a direct economic relationship
with the copyright holders or their licensees.32
¶12
Because of this revenue model, the television industry has
previously opposed technological innovations that threaten to displace or
mitigate advertising effectiveness. The potential for lost advertising
revenue was one of the industry’s primary objections to the introduction of
the VCR, as they feared the ability of consumers to record programs and

28

Press Release, Motion Pictures Association of America, Studios File First
Wave of Suits Against Online Illegal File Traders, (Nov.16, 2004) available at
http://www.respectcopyrights.org/11-16-04_Lawsuit_Press_Release.pdf (last
visited Jan. 10, 2005).
29
Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 63, 106. (2002-2003).
30
Id.
31
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 453
(D.C. Cal. 1979) (quoting Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
415 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1974)).
32
Id. Some new services, like VOD, allow consumers to purchase ad-free
programs directly to watch at their discretion on a la carte basis. CBS Executive
David Poltrack indicated that networks may soon allow customers to buy VOD
content at an estimated price of $1 per show. John Consoli, Kicking VOD's
Tires, MEDIAWEEK, Dec. 13, 2004, at
http://www.mediaweek.com/mediaweek/headlines/article_display.jsp?vnu_cont
ent_id=1000735709 (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
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watch them while skipping over advertisements would damage the market
for television commercials. 33 In reality, the effect on advertising from VCR
time-shifting was minimal, as A.C. Nielsen estimated in 1991 that only 3%
of television consumption came through the playback of recorded programs
and only 40% of those viewers attempted to skip advertisements through
fast-forwarding.34

C. Regulatory response to technological threats to copyright
1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
¶13
Because of fears that piracy brought on by digital technology would
severely erode markets for numerous types of copyrights, Congress passed
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in 1998.35 This act took
several steps to prevent the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works,
most notably the introduction of “anti-circumvention” regulations that made
it a crime to “circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a [copyrighted] work.”36 This language was designed to prevent
unauthorized distribution of copy-protected works (such as music CDs or
DVDs), by criminalizing any technology intentionally designed to copy
such files. Although the legislation largely predated the file-sharing
phenomenon brought on by Napster, the entertainment industry has been
successful in invoking the DMCA to prevent the spread of anticircumvention technology capable of descrambling DVD content.37
Therefore, the DMCA remains at least relevant in preventing the
distribution of television shows copied from copy-protected broadcasts or
official DVD releases.
2. Broadcast Flag (FCC 03-273)
¶14
Although the language of the DMCA remains relevant enough to
discourage the copying of DVDs and other copy-protected content for
redistribution, this legislation left unanswered questions. Much of current
TV copying occurs by capturing signals delivered either by cable or overthe-air broadcast to television sets or to PCs with no universal copyprotection standard. As television moved toward a digital signal
distribution, the FCC endorsed the Broadcast Flag standard in November
33

Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 452.
Matthew W. Bower, Note, Replaying the Betamax Case for the New Digital
VCRs: Introducing TiVo to Fair Use, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J., 417, 442
(2002).
35
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in relevant part at 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)).
36
Id. at § 1201(A)(1)(a).
37
Fisher, supra note 24, at 95 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)).
34
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2003.38 This regulation requires that, as of July 2005, any hardware capable
of receiving a digital TV (“DTV”) signal be capable of recognizing and
responding to a copy-protection rights management system embedded in the
signal, and, preventing the unauthorized distribution of that signal.39 The
FCC endorsed such a policy primarily because “the potential threat of mass
indiscriminate redistribution will deter content owners from making high
value digital content available through broadcasting outlets absent some
content protection mechanism.”40 In other words, the Broadcast Flag was
designed specifically to prevent the unauthorized redistribution of television
content.
While its proponents argue that this regulation is necessary to
motivate copyright holders to introduce digital TV content, the Broadcast
Flag is not without critics. The Electronic Frontier Foundation offered
staunch opposition to the bill, suggesting that Broadcast Flag requirements
would limit “innovation in the high-end digital video technology, wireless
home networks, digital displays, and more” and were “the latest piece of a
broad effort by copyright holders to attain perfect control over every use of
a copyrighted work, even within a private home.”41 The Center for
Democracy and Technology suggested that although the regulation is
important for promoting the expansion of digital programming, it could
frustrate ostensibly reasonable consumer uses, prohibit fair uses of content,
and may extend beyond the FCC’s jurisdiction.42 The Broadcast Flag was
also opposed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, which
expressed consumer and privacy protection concerns, as well as the position
that Broadcast Flag will be ineffective at successfully preventing
unauthorized copying.43
¶15

II. ARE THERE “FAIR USES” OF SHARED TELEVISION CONTENT?
¶16
Because the sharing of television, unlike music or movies, often
occurs between consumers who already have access to the content through a
free over-the-air broadcast or through cable subscription, some forms of
peer-to-peer trading of television content present a strong argument of fair
use, although judicial protection remains unlikely.

38

FCC, DIGITAL BROADCAST CONTENT PROTECTION, FCC 03-273. (2003).
Id.
40
Id. at I.4.
41
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 6.
42
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH., IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROADCAST FLAG:
A PUBLIC INTEREST PRIMER (VERSION 2.0), Dec. 2003, at 18, 24, 26, available
at http://www.cdt.org/copyright/031216broadcastflag.pdf (last visited Jan. 10,
2005).
43
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 14.
39
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A. Fair use as an exception to copyright protection
As authorized by the U.S. Constitution44 and defined by Congress,
copyright protection grants owners the “exclusive right” to reproduce and
distribute copies of the work, prepare derivative works based on the
copyrighted work, and perform or display the work publicly.45 Despite the
comprehensiveness of these exclusive rights, Congress codified a statutory
exemption to copyright infringement liability in 1976 based on the common
law doctrine of “fair use.” According to the Copyright Act, fair use is based
on an analysis of four factors:
¶17

1. the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.46

B. Time-shifting as authorized in Betamax
¶18
The Betamax case originally introduced the concept of fair use to
television viewing.47 Movie studios argued that VCR technology threatened
to harm potential markets by (a) reducing the ability to market movies in
theaters or on video and (b) reducing the audience and advertisement
demand for repeat or even first-run showings.48

The Court first considered the plaintiffs’ argument that VCR
distribution was contributory infringement because it allowed consumers to
record television programming, thus violating the license implicit in the
broadcast.49 On this note, the Court determined that the sale of copying
equipment is not prohibited if the “product is widely used for legitimate,
¶19

44

“Congress shall have the Power…To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST., art.
I, §8.
45
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
46
Id. at § 107.
47
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984).
48
Id. at 483 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49
Id. at 441.
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unobjectionable purposes” and “capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.”50
¶20
Next, the majority agreed with the district court that “unauthorized
home time-shifting of respondent’s programs is legitimate fair use.”51 In
determining fair use, the Court focused on the fourth factor. First, the
majority determined that, because many copyright holders would support
and authorize time-shifting as a means of expanding the viewer population,
there were substantial noninfringing uses for the VCR.52 Second,
unauthorized, but noncommercial, recording of programs was fair use
primarily because the plaintiff failed to prove a likelihood that such use
would result in future harm to the copyright holder’s market.53 Specifically,
the Court endorsed the district court’s findings that (a) there was no factual
basis that those who viewed recorded copies would watch less live TV or
attend less theatrical releases54 and (b) marketing research revealed that
time-shifting likely would increase, rather than decrease, a program’s
demand in rerun or syndication.55 Therefore, because time-shifting was a
substantial noninfringing use, VCR manufacturers were not liable for this
practice. It must be noted that the majority left open the opportunity for
Congressional clarification on the legality of time-shifting of televised
programming. 56
¶21
On the other hand, the dissent argued that the making of a videotape
for home viewing was an “ordinary rather than productive use” and
therefore declined to “permit unfettered use of this new technology in order
to increase access to television programming.”57 Because time-shifting
could have an impact on the potential market for the copyright holder’s
works, the practice should not be protected as fair use. According to the
dissent, in order to invoke fair use, the infringer cannot simply prove that
the net result of infringement was positive to the copyright holder, but that
the challenged use had not damaged the ability to “demand compensation

50

Id.
Id.
52
This determination was based partly on the testimony of Fred Rogers of Mr.
Rogers’ Neighborhood, who stated that he had no objection to taping for
noncommercial use and believed this to be a service to his audience. Id.
53
Id. at 454.
54
Id. at 453 n. 37.
55
Id. at 453 n. 38.
56
“It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new technology,
just as it has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to
apply laws that have not yet been written.” Id. at 456.
57
Id. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51
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from (or to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be willing to
pay to see or hear the copyrighted work.”58

C. Fair use implications of space-shifting
¶22
The proliferation of digital recording and transferring capabilities in
the 1990s created a new form of potentially noncommercial use of
copyright through “space-shifting,” the transfer of legitimately owned
content from one medium or storage device to another.59 In Recording
Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.,
representatives of the music industry challenged the introduction of
Diamond’s Rio mp3 player by arguing that that its digital recording
capabilities violated the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA).60 In ruling
for Diamond, the Ninth Circuit explained that “merely mak[ing] copies in
order to render portable, or ‘space-shift,’ those files that already reside a
user’s hard drive” was “paradigmatic noncommercial personal use.”61
¶23
However, the practice of space-shifting via digital recording and
transfer of copyrighted content was interpreted differently by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.62 In UMG, the My.MP3.com service,
which permitted subscribers to access copyrighted music files via the
Internet after proving they owned legitimate CD copies of the content, was
not protected under fair use.63 Under the fourth factor, the court found that
the defendant’s interference with the Internet download market, which the
plaintiffs had not yet entered, was sufficient to negatively affect the
potential market for the copyrighted works, thus weighing against fair use.64

58

Id. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Space-shifting is defined as “the act of copying digital content for use on a
device other than the one for which it is was originally intended, such as
copying a music from a compact disc to an MP3 file for use on a portable MP3
player, or copying an MP3 file onto a compact disc for use in a digital audio
player.” DRM WATCH, available at
http://drmwatch.webopedia.com/TERM/S/space_shifting.html (last visited Mar.
20, 2005).
60
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1999). See 17 U.S.C. §1001-10 (1992).
61
Id.
62
92 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). It should be noted that fair use was argued
to defend the actions of MP3.com, which copied and uploaded copyrighted
content to its commercial web site, rather than the actions of the MP3.com’s
customers, who subsequently downloaded the music files from that site. Id. at
351.
63
Id. at 353.
64
Id. at 352.
59
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In 2001, the Ninth Circuit in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
ruled that the Napster network, which facilitated the unauthorized trading of
music files, was not protected under fair use even if users were spaceshifting by downloading or transferring previously purchased files via the
network.65 Although Napster claimed that this form of space-shifting was
one form of legitimate use, the court disagreed because listing a music file
on Napster for the purposes of downloading that file elsewhere also
inappropriately made that file publicly available to millions of users.66

¶24

D. Extending Betamax to unauthorized television file sharing
¶25
Although arguments can be made differentiating television content
from the file sharing held to be infringing uses in UMG and Napster,
acquiring a television show via an unauthorized peer-to-peer network is
probably not fair use. An analysis of the first and fourth fair use factors,
arguably the most relevant factors for television time-shifting and peer-topeer file sharing,67 does not support copyright exemption. Under the first
factor, purpose and character of use, viewing recorded television within the
home has been protected as noncommercial,68 and it is conceivable that
most downloaders of broadcast shows had permission to view content at its
initial airtime. However, noncommercial use is weakened when content is
acquired via an anonymous, public peer-to-peer network, and is unlikely to
be protected as fair use.69

Regarding the fourth factor, the effect upon real or potential
markets, the minimal financial impact of the VCR,70 and the currently
unsettled empirical impact of file-sharing on copyright holders’ revenue71
suggest that television copyright holders have yet to definitively prove
substantial damage to actual or potential markets. On the other hand,
weighing against fair use protection, recent research suggests that new
¶26

65

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1004.
67
The second and third factors are often conceded in entertainment file-sharing
cases as weighing against fair use because creative works are clearly protected
under copyright and the nature of digital file sharing facilitates copying files in
their entirety. See UMG, 92 F.Supp.2d at 351-2; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
68
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
69
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
70
Bower, supra note 34, at 442.
71
See Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, THE EFFECT OF FILE SHARING ON
RECORD SALES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WORKING PAPER, March 2004
available at http://www.nber.org/~confer/2004/URCs04/felix.pdf (last visited
Jan. 10, 2005).
66
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television recording technologies will have a much bigger impact on
television broadcasters’ advertising and other revenue.72
¶27
Finally, significant policy shifts away from unauthorized copyright
use indicate that a fair use ruling is unlikely. Technological legislation,
such as the DMCA and Broadcast Flag, suggest a more recent
Congressional intent to limit distribution of television content without
authorization and also weighs heavily against fair use.

1. The first factor
¶28
The first fair use factor evaluates “the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes.”73 Although some aspects of television file-sharing
would appear noncommercial in nature, judicial precedent suggests that this
practice is unlikely to be protected as fair use under the first factor.
¶29
Indeed, valid arguments exist for the characterization of television
sharing as noncommercial. First, the practice of downloading television
files that a consumer had legitimate access to on initial broadcast for the
purpose of consumption in the home is arguably a noncommercial use. In
Betamax, the majority endorsed the district court’s finding that “timeshifting for private home use must be characterized as a noncommercial,
nonprofit activity,” thus weighing in favor of fair use under the first factor.74
The Court noted that the “time-shifter no more steals the program by
watching it once than does the live viewer,”75 More recently in Diamond,
the transfer of music files to a digital recording device by users with
legitimate access to the copyrighted work was seen as a “paradigmatic
noncommercial personal use.”76

Second, weighing in favor of fair use is the fact that file traders
have access to at least a substantial segment of shows either through free
broadcast or cable subscriptions. In Betamax, the Court upheld the right to
time-shift partly because consumers already had free access to this content
upon broadcast.77 Although the landscape of television has changed, with
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ad-supported cable programming now constituting as much as 55.1%
market share in primetime, free broadcast network television still takes up
over one-third of the primetime share.78 Therefore, traded television shows
from broadcast network television would meet the same criteria of those
protected for time-shifting by the Supreme Court.
¶31
Beyond broadcast, approximately two-thirds of U.S. households
subscribe to some form of cable service.79 Under the Betamax reasoning,
these users could argue that they have already been granted permission to
view cable programs through a paid subscription; therefore, time-shifting
through downloading should be protected as fair use. Of course, copyright
holders can, and do, specifically retain the right to control redistribution and
alternative forms of paid subscription content in their commercial
transmissions, thereby frustrating the cable subscriber’s fair use argument.

On the other hand, television sharing under the first factor is
unlikely to be characterized as noncommercial and a fair use. There is a
fundamental difference between personally recording within the home for
home use and acquiring that content from an anonymous, external trader. In
fact, downloading a television file in order to view it at a more convenient
time or place might be more analogous to space-shifting.80 Betamax was
silent on whether distribution of time-shifted copies beyond the home
would still be considered a private, noncommercial use.81 In deciding
against fair use within the Napster network, the Ninth Circuit ruled against
space-shifting as fair use, emphasizing the anonymous and public nature of
file-trading.82 Therefore, when more modern decisions are examined, filesharing of a television program stands on tenuous ground as a protected use.
¶32
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In addition, downloading music from the Napster network was, at
least according to the Ninth Circuit, a commercial use based on a “showing
that repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works
were made to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies.”83
Ultimately, commerciality hinged on the district court’s determination that
“Napster users get for free something they would normally have to buy.”84
Based on the traditional perception of broadcast television as a freely
distributed good (or cable television as a good legitimately purchased by the
majority of households),85 it would be difficult to argue that television file
sharers download primarily to avoid legitimate compensation in the same
manner as Napster users. Therefore, downloading a show to view it once
within the home could be noncommercial, assuming the user was not
downloading for the purpose of avoiding payment, such as a basic or
premium cable subscription.
¶33

¶34
However, this reasoning assumes the historical distribution of
television primarily in one form (i.e., live transmission) and does not
consider that television could be offered in a variety of forms (for a variety
of prices). For example, the current television market has already evolved
so that consumers can acquire the same show (a) live, with advertisements,
at no additional cost on free broadcast networks or within a cable
subscription package; (b) “on demand” and ad-free for a premium fee;86 or
(c) in a commercially-available DVD compilation.87 Therefore, copyright
holders could argue that the downloading of more convenient digital
television files effectively circumvents the need to purchase legitimate
premium copies, such as those available through VOD or DVDs. Under this
rationale, downloading television files in order to avoid payment would be
commercial under the test applied to Napster users.
¶35
Lastly, space-shifting by downloading television files for more
convenient viewing would not qualify for fair use protection under the first
factor merely on the basis of improved consumer ease-of-use. In UMG, the
court rejected the argument that providing music files through MP3.com to
utilize the convenience of Internet storage over traditional CD media should
be protected.88 Although this fair use decision concerned MP3.com as a
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facilitator of convenience for its users, it remains unlikely that the
convenience of downloading a television show for personal viewing would
be sufficient to justify fair use under the first factor.
2. The fourth factor
¶36
The fourth fair use factor examines “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”89 The lack of
consensus on the impact file-sharing has on television revenues prevents a
definitive forecast of this practice as fair use under this factor. To
demonstrate harm to a present or potential market, copyright holders bear
the burden of proving that file-sharing of television shows will potentially
harm future primary or derivative markets.90 To date, numerous reports
have suggested that unauthorized file-sharing has, and will continue to have,
a detrimental effect on entertainment revenues.91 However, other
researchers have suggested that file-sharing may have no impact on
traditional revenue channels92 and may actually improve the efficiency, and
thus profitability, of certain entertainment markets.93 Regardless, divergent
views on the sales effects of file-sharing on other entertainment industries
suggests that the television industry will at least have to deliver persuasive
research demonstrating the damaging effect of file sharing in order to
persuasively defeat fair use.
¶37
Additionally, modern television recording technologies coupled
with the emergence of file-sharing have potentially created a much more
realizable harm to copyright holders than was experienced by the
introduction of the VCR. The Supreme Court protected VCR time-shifting
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because of the district court’s finding that “harm from time-shifting is
speculative and, at best, minimal.”94 Even by 1991, when VCRs had
substantially penetrated U.S. households, only 3% of television viewing
occurred using VCR time-shifting methods, with 40% of those users using
time-shifting to skip commercials.95 Consequently, this resulted in minimal
damage to TV advertising revenues. Furthermore, without file-sharing
networks, the small subset of TV viewers who recorded programs using
their VCR could not easily redistribute content.
¶38
On the other hand, research on digital recording use suggests that
PVRs and other digital recording technologies alone may reduce live
audiences by as much as 15% by 2010, resulting in losses of $5.5 billion in
advertising revenue.96 To date, comprehensive research on the viewing of
downloaded television shows has yet to be conducted. However, anecdotal
evidence suggests that many downloaded shows have already been stripped
of advertisements97 and, based on the viewing habits of consumers of
digitally pre-recorded television,98 it is likely that a substantial portion of
television downloaded with advertisements will eventually be viewed adfree.
¶39
Moreover, recording via more advanced digital TV tuners can
create copies of a higher quality, and more easily transferable with the
advent of the Internet, than those made possible with a VCR. The resulting
unauthorized copy of comparable quality, which can be viewed at any time
and easily transferred to multiple users, provides a much bigger threat to
displace the original than was conceivable under Betamax. Specifically, the
widespread availability of free television content on peer-to-peer networks
would severely undermine the $2.3 billion market for television DVDs.99
Therefore, a significant shift away from live viewing in favor of
downloaded television files could lead to significant losses in live television
advertising revenue and direct-to-consumer DVD sales for television
broadcasters in a way unseen with VCR use. Such an impact would reduce
the value of the copyrighted work, and weighs against fair use.100

Another technological innovation unanticipated in Betamax is the
emergence of VOD television programming. VOD allows viewers to
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immediately access archived television content, complete with the ability to
pause, fast-forward or rewind, by paying a premium fee – without the added
hassle of recording that program in the first place.101 Some analysts predict
that this added convenience will allow television content providers to
demand “sky-high licensing rates” for such access in the future.102 Although
VOD is currently offered predominantly for cable or premium content,
broadcast networks are likely to enter this market in the future with the
potential for substantial profits.103 However, the emergence of a robust filesharing universe in which consumers can download the same television
content instantly at no cost surely will frustrate the emergence of VOD,
which offers a very similar value proposition, but for a fee. The widespread
downloading of television files is likely to be considered a potential harm to
the copyright holders’ market; accordingly, the introduction of VOD is yet
another factor weighing against fair use.
3. Shifts in Legislative Policy
¶41
In addition to judicial precedent weighing against fair use,
significant legislation since the Betamax decision suggests that public
policy stands opposed to the distribution of televised content as a fair use.
First, the DMCA specifically states that “no person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work.”104
Because digital television will permit distributors to copy-protect television
content, any subsequent copying and redistribution of this content that
technologically circumvents copy-protection would inherently oppose
Congressional intent. Therefore, it seems unlikely that any court would
endorse as fair use the downloading of television files created in direct
opposition to the spirit of the DMCA.
¶42
Second, Broadcast Flag regulation was specifically designed to
prevent the “potential threat of mass indiscriminate redistribution” of digital
television content.105 Again, any unauthorized file-sharing of copy-protected
television content is in direct defiance of this regulatory standard. The FCC
has made small concessions to potential sharers, including approval of a
101
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TiVo feature that allows subscribers to share content with up to 10 other
users who share the same customer account.106 However, this is a far cry
from a deregulated TV-sharing environment. Although FCC regulation does
not authoritatively represent Congressional intent and the FCC was clear
that “the scope of our decision does not reach existing copyright law,”107 the
passage of Broadcast Flag suggests that unauthorized trading of copyprotected television files is unlikely to remain protected alongside FCC
regulations implemented specifically to prevent such redistribution.

III. SHOULD THE TELEVISION INDUSTRY AUTHORIZE PEER-TO-PEER
CONTENT SHARING?
¶43
Even if we concede (or the Supreme Court decides) that the sharing
of television content between paying customers is not fair use, should
television content owners forgo some copyright control by authorizing the
sharing of programming via peer-to-peer networks? The introduction of
new technology has forced the entertainment industry to define a collective
stance opposing unauthorized digital copying, but much uncertainty remains
regarding the future of entertainment distribution. “Hollywood, electronics
companies, the government and consumers are all staking out positions on
the great policy spectrum that extends from Willy-Nilly Copying Freedom
on one end to Intrusively Oppressive Copy Protection on the other,” wrote
David Pogue of The New York Times.108 “Settling on a mutually agreeable
position will take some time.”109
¶44
Although restricting all unauthorized forms of copying is an
understandable position, copyright holders often stand to gain by
encouraging consumers to copy and distribute works. The Betamax
decision foretold such potential in 1984, explaining that “copyright law
does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of his works,
and…the owner of a copyright may well have economic or noneconomic
reasons for permitting certain kinds of copying to occur without receiving
direct compensation from the copier.”110
¶45
The movie and television industries vehemently opposed the
introduction of the VCR because they feared the ability to record television
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programs would erode the market for syndication111 and allow viewers to
create a personal library from recorded programs.112 Additionally, television
executives worried that the ability to replay recorded television and “fastforward” commercials would dilute the market for their works (in the form
of advertising revenue).113 In reality, the introduction of the VCR ultimately
added a substantial revenue stream to movie studios (in the form of video
rentals and sales) and created new markets for prerecorded videos of
television shows.114 Furthermore, television advertising revenues have
continued to remain strong, with the industry generating $44.8 billion in
revenue in 2001.115
Despite the staunch opposition from the music industry, some
commentators have suggested, albeit controversially, that unauthorized filesharing may have no detrimental impact on retail music sales.116 Hence, it
is well within the realm of possibility that similar sharing of television
shows may not affect the retail market for this content (via VOD, DVD
compilations, etc.) Research suggests that, rather than diluting demand, the
larger a television show’s initial audience, the more value that show will
retain in syndication.117 For this reason, the ability to distribute copyrighted
television shows cheaply and efficiently via peer-to-peer networks after
their original airdate may actually increase the frequency with which this
programming (including its advertising) is viewed, thus raising the value of
the underlying content. Therefore, television copyright holders might
consider a “laissez-faire” approach to file-sharing, regardless of the fate of
the practice as fair use.
¶46

CONCLUSION
¶47
The recent phenomenon of peer-to-peer file sharing has made an
indelible impact on all forms of entertainment. As discussed above, the
television industry has not been immune to this revolutionary shift in how
consumers acquire copyrighted content. The distribution of hundreds of
thousands of unauthorized copies of popular television shows such as The
Simpsons, The Sopranos, and Friends on file-sharing networks118 suggests
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that television downloading is popular and, according to television
executives, “a very serious growing problem.”119
¶48
Regardless of industry concern, the emergence of file-sharing as an
alternative method for the acquisition of television content raises interesting
questions about the potential for protection under fair use. The similarities
with personal time-shifting as protected by the Supreme Court in Betamax
are substantial.120 Much like using a VCR, the television downloader may
view prerecorded shows that he was fully permitted to view in their original
form. Similarly, the television industry has yet to conclusively demonstrate
that the widespread proliferation of file-sharing will materially affect future
revenues. Finally, viewing prerecorded content within the home could be
construed as a noncommercial use, especially if that user has made no effort
to avoid a licensing fee.

However, key differences and developments in the television
landscape suggest that television downloading is unlikely to qualify for fair
use protection. Unlike the consumer who watches a show recorded with his
own VCR, the downloader has not recorded the content himself and must
seek out these programs from anonymous public networks. Furthermore, the
post-Betamax introduction of the DMCA121 and Broadcast Flag standard122
suggest that legislative and regulatory policy has shifted to a clear interest in
protecting copyright holders from the threat of new technologies such as
file-sharing. Finally, the advances in recording technology and emergence
of new markets, such as VOD, suggest that unfettered, unauthorized
recording and sharing of content would have a much more substantial
impact on the market for copyrighted works than those inflicted by the
VCR.
¶49

¶50
In conclusion, although some research suggests that television
copyright holders may see substantial gains in some areas from the
authorization of file-sharing, this will be a decision ultimately placed in the
hands of the television distributors themselves. Regardless of how the
television industry chooses to utilize the online distribution of content,
unauthorized sharing of copyrighted television files is unlikely to gain fair
use protection.
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